Personality in the context of ilyenkov’s philosophical and pedagogical ideas

Recently, the science of psychology has been increasingly paying attention to the concept of activity. So has the science of pedagogy. There is even such a course in colleges: "Fundamentals of educational research activity". But it seems that long conversations about activity only complicate the matter. Why is it so? It is simply because in their conversations and teaching aids, scientists bypass such a science as philosophy. Therefore, they cannot understand what activity is in its purest form, on its own, and without solving this general question, researchers will always stumble over particulars. The development of philosophical thought from Parmenides to Hegel was the search for this pure form. In Hegel's 'Science of Logic', this form acquires its concrete content, logic becomes meaningful, since it fully reflects the real subject-transforming activity of a man - labor.

Let us examine the historical origin of activity in the context of Hegel's Logic. This point is the birth of a man, in which a pre-man breaks the established pattern of animal behavior determined by instincts for millions of years and begins to create a new pattern of matching himself with objective reality. This transformation is carried out through a collective tool-subject activity. Considered as activities, the processes of training, education, research (which are undoubtedly also inherent in the animal world) acquire a new quality. But in order to understand it, one contemplative view of the world is not enough. Activity is known only through activity. Here, of course, there is a tautology, but there is no other way ' trying to comprehend activity not from within, not according to its laws, will be false.

Therefore, before starting the analysis of activity as such, let us take a closer look at the behavior of animals with a still contemplative look. With this approach, animals are very close to us. Being in the position of contemplation, we will not see the singularity of an animal as its attributive characteristic. On the contrary, we can envy the skill of a lynx teaching its cubs to hunt, admire the wisdom of the she-wolf's 'pedagogical talent', who refuses to recognize its wolf cubs a year after their birth and thereby teaches them to be independent, and the case of a white bear training a jump at a seal has already become the psychological and pedagogical classics. 'P.Ya. Halperin gives a curious example from the notes of one polar traveler, which tells how a young bear cub, having missed a seal, began to practice this jump in the absence of a real goal, i.e. to measure the strength of the shock and the length of the distance' [1, p. 131].

But, despite this observed wisdom of animals, if we talk about their 'activity', we always use quotation marks. Why? After all, an animal is capable of complying with its behavior with categories that Immanuel Kant considered a priori inherent in the subject - space and time. These are the categoriesthat help the predator to catch up with the prey. In predator hunting, 'the result is achieved through extrapolating activity. Here, the subjective image of the situation maintains the certainty of the spatial and temporal changes and, due to this, goes beyond the limits of the given perception, expands this perception in terms of time and space. This expansion is the subjective retention of the spatial and temporal image of reality as a condition for the feasibility of a productive action' [ibid., p. 132].

In the above passage, the word 'activity' could be used without quotes, since the animal acts as a subject here, is the master of the situation and acquires freedom in the form of the productivity of the action. But it does not gain freedom in its own form, freedom as such. What is a new attribute, unknown to animals, that introduces activity to an emerging human society? This attribute is mutual assistance. And the core of this attribute is a tool of labor, which also embodies both the subjective factor, since it is the subject that uses the tool, and objective factor, since with the help of the tool the surrounding human nature is transformed in accordance with the interests of a man.

Naturally, at first these interests are not much different from the needs of animals - they are completely organic. But thanks to the emergence of a tool, the manufacture of new tools, a man develops new interests, which are more and more different from the desires of his ancestors, up to the needs in the ideal and spiritual, which are unknown to the animal world.

Separation of the ideal from tool-sensitive practice into a special sphere was a necessary step in the development of a man, a step in knowing himself, the goals and meanings of his being in the world around him. Naturally, the first myths about the origin of a man differ significantly from the scientific understanding of reality, but both the first religions ascribing human qualities to nature (animism) and the movement of activity in a pure logical form belong to this sphere.

Recognition of the moment of separation of real and ideal activities is very important in the context of understanding the development of personality. After all, this very point is the generic principle of determining a historical person. How true will the judgment be that the same point marks the beginning of a man in the process of ontogenesis? Do phylogenesis and ontogenesis coincide in this moment?

To what degree can we say that a one-year-old child who has learned the empty names of surrounding objects has become a man? Is this the beginning of a man's personal form? In the context of these questions, it is quite appropriate to recall Hegel's 'Science of Logic'. According to Hegel, the logical beginning is 'the absence of definitions', where 'pure being and pure nothing are ... identical notions' [2, p. 69]. But, nevertheless, this is the beginning. The beginning in itself, is not yet laid. 'Nothing has not yet been formed in the being, although the being is essentially nothing, and vice versa' [ibid., p. 88].

But in the context of personality development, this Hegel's idea requires clarification. To realize himself as a man, a child must completely enter the area of the universal, transfer completely 'from a separate finite being to being, as such, taken in its completely abstract universality' [Ibid., p. 75]. That is, mere words are not yet the beginning of a man in the ontogenesis. Here, the baby is still firmly connected with his 'separate finite being'. 'The definition of finite things consists in separating the concepts of the idea and being, the idea and reality, the soul and body are separable from each other, and therefore they are transient and mortal' [Ibid., p. 75-76].

A personality as an infinite 'thing' must begin with a 'completely abstract universality'. And this will be possible only when the baby is given the opportunity to create his own 'language' universe. And the more direct it will be, the greater the potential for personal unfolding in it. It is impossible to bypass the language in personality development.

It turns out from early childhood, from tender nails, the child must be taught not only to read, but also to write books! To write a story (draw a picture) about their own conscience and its sister - the bare truth (the real events of the upbringing of the granddaughter of G.V. Lobastov - Anya are reproduced) [3, p. 160-161], etc. And this should be done without any prior discussion of the plot!

But what's the danger of the predetermined plot, which, incidentally, is actively used by child psychologists at the Russian State Humanitarian University [4]. Doesn't the imagining of the adventures of a snowman in the seasons develop the mind, doesn't a child 'learn dialectics' (as psychologists say) when a snowman goes from winter to spring, and then into summer and autumn?

Imagination here may be developing, but not in its logical understanding. Only a man himself can put himself inside the image. It's like a character of the Soviet movie 'A Main Recess', an 'adult bully' Ganzha writing in the composition 'Who I want to be like' that he wanted to be  like himself only. And a young and talented teacher gave him an unsatisfactory mark.

Do we have a lot of such 'bullies' at school now? Any desire to stand out, 'show off' is always a desire 'to be like'. The film shows where the roots of such an unusual bullying of Ganzha come from - the evening school is located at a chemical factory where Ganzha is respected for its skillful hands. His square shoulders and a confident smile seem to confirm that all the knowledge the 'bully'  can get in school he is able to get himself with his own hands. And he is absolutely right, that's why he does not complain about the unsatisfactory mark to Nestor Petrovich, but rather, he himself becomes a teacher to a teacher. And not only him - all students of the wonderful 9 'A' class.

Of course, the film looks like a fairy tale. And fairy tale is not life. Especially our life, modern, where everything has become a commodity: the soul, the heart, the knowledge, and the working hands. But after all, the child hasn't seen Vassilissa the Beautiful or Gorynych Snake in his life. And he hasn't travelled to Kon-Tiki. And he hasn't travelled for 80 leagues under water with Jules Verne. But however, the child was there. By himself.

Therefore, a fairy tale is so important in early childhood - the child is so passionate about the plot that he acquires a self through this illusion. For a brief moment of fairy tale narration, the childs tries on the armor of a hero and fights with Kashchei, the Serpent and Baba Yaga (Old Witch). Is this an illusion? It is. But it makes it possible for the child to create 'his own fairy tale', create his ideal world, express his Word.

But does the child have no self with smart, joint and shared activities in mastering the finite things of the real world? Doesn't the child himself hammer in nails when the wise teacher 'takes away his hand in time' (Ilyenkov)? Then what is the difference between the 'self' of hammering nails from the 'self' of creativity in the area of the ideal? The difference is in the universality of its coverage. 'The universal is the truth of sensory certainty, and the language expresses only this true' [5, p. 53].

This is where exactly pedagogy 'slips', when it is trying to build its work on materialistic principles without knowing the dialectics. Despite the fact that universal tool-sensory activity is primary in the formation of the human spirit, culture, only language can single out and fix this universality. Therefore, if the child does not get the conditions created for the expression of universal sensual things, he will never be able to take a step from causality to self-determination in his development. He cannot become a substance that creates itself.

But do all educators understand this? The task of understanding the transformation of a child into a substance is not an easy task. It really requires serious philosophical preparation, because it is necessary to keep at one point the Marxist understanding of free labor, the Kantian a priori of the categories of space and time and the Hegelian removal of being in essence. Such 'retention' also leads to Fichte's philosophy as the key to pedagogy [1].

As an aid to the teacher, we will try to expand the point of identity of the positions of Marx, Kant, Hegel into the notion of educational research activity. And at the same time, we will also clarify for ourselves the essential details without which actual interaction with the child is impossible. Let us start with Marx.

In his 'Theses on Feuerbach', Marx gives the following definition of the essence of a man: 'The essence of man is not an abstract thing inherent in an individual person. In its reality, it is the totality of all social relations' [6, p. 265]. Here Marx contrasts his understanding of the essence of a man with Feuerbach's understanding. In Feuerbach, 'a human essence can only be regarded as a 'genus ', as an internal, mute universality, connecting many individuals only by natural ties' [Ibid., p. 266]. But what is the reason for this position of Feuerbach? Marx explains that Feuerbach, in spite of the fact that he 'wants to deal with sensory objects, really different from mental objects, ... takes human activity itself not as objective activity' [Ibid., p. 264], and, accordingly, he is compelled to 'abstract from the course of history, consider the religious feeling [Gemüt] separately and assume an abstract - isolated - human individual' [Ibid., p. 266]. Such is the position of contemplative materialism. And here, of course, there can be no talk of any essence in its Hegelian understanding. Here is only the contemplation of immediate being. And therefore, the reflection as the main principle of action in its essence is only external, formal. And, accordingly, the essence of a man 'according to Feuerbach' is only a 'kind', 'dumb universality'.

This is not the case with Marx. Marx proposes to realize the reflection of the contemplated being in activity. And at the same time he learns from idealists, first of all, from Hegel, since Hegel ingeniously guesses (Lenin) in the shift of the categories of 'Science of Logic' the shift of historical human practice. It is in the real transformation of being in the process of objective-sensory activity that Marx sees the identification and manifestation of a human being. It is in this kind of 'reflection' that Marx gives the definition of human essence - 'the totality of all social relations'.

But any thesis requires disclosure, which, in fact, Marx implements in his 'Capital' and not only in this work. Already in his early works, primarily in the 'Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts of 1844', Marx reveals the essence of a man, which exists in the present being of capitalism. In Marx, the totality of social relations represented in the individual is not a 'mute universality'. The universality of Marx speaks in the language of the main Hegelian category - the category of contradiction. The individual of Marx is not the abstract 'half' of Feuerbach, outside of which lies his essence in the form of a religious essence. Marx presents the contradiction of the thesis as the identity of the different: on the one hand, there is human self with its material and spiritual needs, on the other hand, there is the ensemble of all social relations. In the context of such a division of a single, Marx carries out its theoretical activities.

In fact, this is the main contradiction of Marxism, in the resolution of which the developing thought of Marx and Engels moves. In the context of the development of social relations in the direction of its absolute totality, the contradiction is being shaped - on the one hand, from the point of view of consistent materialism, there is nothing in the world except the moving matter, on the other hand, the ideal of Marxism is the personality - a free individuality, not limited by predetermined stamps. Or in a different way: on the one hand, there is a human I, on the other hand, there is all objective reality. Bearing in mind Hegel's Logic, one may ask - what is an intermediate element, a connection between I (the individual) and the objective reality (the universal)? Obviously, activity is such a special element that includes both I and reality. But the logical formula I - O - U is merely the simplest formula of inference, which corresponds to the beginning of the development of a historical person. The individual thing here is 'in-itself'. It defines itself through activity as 'a kind', therefore the role of the individual in the second formula of inference is played by the universal: U - I - '. Now the universal, the kind determined by singularity - means the activity. As a result, there is a third formula of inference: O - U - I. Activity becomes an individual activity, but since it is completely determined by the universal, the individual is identified with the human race and is already able to maintain the contradiction of himself as an individual and himself as a representative of the kind. It is here that the individual becomes the subject. But this is a subject 'in itself'. It becomes a subject 'for itself' when the singularity presented as the universality reveals this universality, that is, it finds objectivity in this 'being-for-oneself' understanding the objectivity of one's essence.

In real practice, objectivity appears earlier, not as a result of the development of logical formulas of inference, as in Hegel. The real practice cannot do without objective reality and its active transformation in accordance with human needs. But activity and understanding of activity are, although related, but nonetheless different. Objectivity is not born from inferences, but objective reality can be understood only at a sufficiently high level of the theoretical development of a man. In the history of human culture, this is the level of Socrates. It was Socrates who was the first in the history of philosophy who was able to identify his Self with the universality of the race. The Self of Socrates exists, and at the same time it does not. Socrates does not dissemble when he says, 'I know that I know nothing'.

The Athenian thinker is 'completely empty' not because he does not think. He is not a Hindu lama at all, who looks at his navel and keeps repeating: "Ohmm." No! Socrates has already mentally gone all the way to the development of Hegel's logical formulas of inference. Starting with the fact that in his activity he seeks a universal ethical norm of the polis, the philosopher, in his dialogue, putting an abstract definition of the universal, defines, like a gadfly, this universal with questions to clarify certain features of the universal and, as a result, the features are determined by the universal, but not abstract universal, but concrete, enriched by the specific issues of Socrates. What does Socrates come to? The philosopher does not give a positive answer to the questions of what is knowledge, good and beautiful in itself. In his endless search he only makes the interlocutors doubt the abstract understanding of the universal, fills his individuality and the interlocutors' individuaity with the universal, as if dissolving in it. In fact, the trial of Socrates is the trial of the rebellious abstract universal of the individuality of the Athenian 'gadfly', presented as the human race.

It is as if Socrates teaches us that in such 'absolutely empty' way, one should approach the understanding of the objective world. In the form of wax, absolute plasticity, as Aristotle subsequently determines the understanding ability, the form of the forms.

But Socrates' 'emptiness' and Aristotle's form of the forms are not John Locke's 'tabula rasa'. It is the unity that holds the universal. And only in this space one should seek the truth of the objective. The first to understand this in modern times was Kant. And it is no coincidence that modern scholars say that 'Marx is inverted Kant' [7, p. 9]. Everything is absolutely accurate here ' Kant's truth is a phenomenon defined by the categories of reason in the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. The truth according to Marx is in a man acquiring his own form, in 'clever' action with a real 'thing'. Kant seeks within the human Self, Marx ' within the objective reality, enriched by an understanding of the concept, which is impossible without Kant.

Hegel also conducts his research in an area closely related to Marx's ideas. If the finding of the objective world in cognition within a single image of self-consciousness in Kant is only supposed to be in the form of categories of reason, Hegel, develops in his 'Science of Logic' logical categories from direct being into an absolute idea and takes the position about which Lenin notes in his abstract: 'In this most idealistic work of Hegel, there is very little idealism, and plenty of materialism. 'It is contradictory,' but it is true!' [8, p. 215].

Indeed, where is idealism here? 'A concept is not only a soul, but also a free concept, which exists for itself and therefore has a personality ' thus, it is a practical, defined in itself and for itself, objective concept, which as a person is an impenetrable, indivisible (atome) subjectivity, but which is also not an exclusive singularity, but universality and cognition for itself and in its other form has its own objectivity as an object' [9, p. 288]. How can one not recall 'The Theses on Feuerbach' again, which only Lenin could fully grasp, not any other Marxist of his time. 'The active side, in contrast to materialism, was developed by idealism, but only abstractly, since idealism, of course, does not know real, sensory activity as such' [6, p. 264].

But to what extent are we ourselves capable of understanding Marx in the era of the global crisis of capitalism, when the world is on the edge of the abyss? Not in the construction of science-like phrases, not in any 'action', but in the Hegelian-Marxist identification of concept and reality? How smart are we ourselves to read 'The Science of Logic?'

Anyone who has taken notes if 'The Science of Logic' at least once, even if he skidded in places where Hegel is 'especially confusing' (Lenin), must have noticed that Hegel has been conducting an in-depth dialogue with Kant for almost all three volumes. But Hegel knew Kant 'far and wide'! And how well do we know Kant in order to scold the Koenigsberg thinker, together with Hegel, for his affection to the world in which Kant does not allow contradictions, and to praise one of the main 'inventions' of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' - the transcendental unity of apperception? It turns out that we need to know Kant not just superficially. And not only Kant. Doesn't Hegel appeal to Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Anselm, Spinoza? It turns out that in order to really understand 'The Science of Logic', one needs to delve into the entire chain of philosophical thought leading up to Hegel.

And here, of course, no school is your assistant. Here you are the very educator (again, 'Theses on Feuerbach'!), who should be brought up. And here, of course, there is a contradiction, which self-education always rests on. In shaping yourself as a personality, one needs to know the logic of the development of subjectivity, the very logic that you have yet to master. After all, even after reading 'the Science of Logic', you have not yet become smart. Hegel only helps a man find their origin, only directs the search to the point where Self begins as Self. But where do we start thinking about the beginning of Selves?

First of all, knowing that the logic of Hegel is the logic of the advancement of activity, it would be quite worthwhile to recall again - where in the advancement of the real historical human practice is the point from which Hegel suggests starting science in his main work? Where is the onset of phylogenesis? According to Hegel, it is where the activity is absolutely insignificant, where being is identical to nothing. But according to Marx, activity is a tool-objective activity, that is, you need to find a point in the development of a historical person, where there are no tools at all, and at the same time the tools exist. But is the existence of such absolutely non-existent tool possible - the 'invisible instrument'?

In the real world there are no such tools, since all the objects of nature have dimensions. So it turns out that the beginning of human history is the moment when a man first person learned to create 'empty' tools - words denoting objects of activity. Therefore, the child, in the process of ontogenesis, first gains simply the names of objects, without any meaning. And this does not contradict Hegel at all, Another thing is where to move on from here? How to develop meaning from mere item names? Shall we improve the verbal sphere? Or the subject sphere? Or their interaction? After all, acting with a real subject called a 'spoon' (chair, table, mom, dad), the child comprehends the meaning of known objects and determines oneself qualitatively. But even finding his ways of action with objects does not yet give the baby his personal beginning. A personality emerges in the moment of realizing oneself as a free being, as a man who creates himself through activities with objects of human culture. And this requires reflection on what you have created.

In his self-determination movement, the child must eliminate causality. That is, he is to learn to be dependent only on himself. A wise parent, even without reading Hegel, may be extremely attentive to the endless 'why' of his child, and vice versa, a professional philosopher may remain deaf to the curiosity of a little man who wants to know 'why the grass is green'. But, nevertheless, it is important to know Hegel, for the sake of the discipline the teacher himself, since the transition from causality to unconditionally is a key moment in the advancement of the individual. After all, if one is careless, inattentive and doesn't know the logic of the child's development, then it may turn out that all subsequent filling the child's soul with the knowledge will turn out to be a complete profanity, a parody of personality development.

The natural course of personal development is entering a position of a substance - the point where being and essence of a man are identified as identical. Here, too, is the origin of the personality - the acquisition of an absolute attitude, that is, a state where, in his action with any object, the child sees an attitude to himself. The immediacy of this attitude gives birth to a concept. Hegel calls this beginning 'supersensible, inner contemplation' [9, p. 292]. He further explains. 'The directness of sensory contemplation is diverse and individual. But cognition is conceptual thinking; therefore, its beginning is also found only in the elements of thinking; it is something simple and universal' [Ibid.]. In his initial internal contemplation, the child is freed from the singularity of objects - he does not contemplate them at all in his beginning, although he already has the possibility of understanding them at that beginning. So what does the child contemplate at the point of the birth of his personality?

The point of onset of phylogenesis and the point of the birth of a personality during ontogenesis do not coincide. The historical person, as noted above, begins with the separation of real and ideal moments of activity. A personality begins with the free contemplation of being. The pre-existence of a personality is the genesis of concept according to Hegel.

A personality begins with an active entry into being. Up to the state of reflection, and further, to the comprehensive identification of the essence and fixation of the contradiction, the resolution of which establishes the basis of personality.

But how do we move from being to reflection? This question is the most difficult to understand, because the way of entering the being is seemingly known to parents and professional educators ' it's in mastering objects of human culture - a spoon, a chair, clothes, toys, a hammer, nails, plasticine, paper, a brush for painting, paints - the list can be continued on and on, but in the above-mentioned subjects there is a difference in functions, both insignificant and cardinal. For example, a spoon, a chair, clothes involve the specifics of meeting the most basic needs; plasticine, brushes, paints are designed to develop a child's imagination; a hammer and nails make it possible to combine a developed imagination with primary skills of action with material objects and create independently (through a joint and shared activity with an adult) the very object of the basic necessity, for example, a stool that the child has simply consumed previously. So where is the exit to reflection here? If the child baked pies with his grandmother, and then also fried pancakes, can we say that the reflection has already taken place? If the pancakes are tasty ' that's great and that means the child has already reached the base of personality, if the pies got burnt ' the child is yet immature, 'weak at the knees', so he needs to work hard and reach the beginning in order to go on a path from which he can't take a turn... After all, labor created a man, and that's why you need to teach the child to act with the greatest number of objects of human culture, and in some cases to create them by himself. It is necessary to educate children, and not to speculate, especially about reflection...

But if we approach the issue without irony, then isn't the creation of a thing with one's own hands a reflection? After all, the layman of Nikolas of Cusa also shaped spoons as opposed to the philosopher-scribes [10, p. 391-392]. But one can argue - the layman had already had 'spoonness' in his imagination before creative work. And he knew where it came from. The child creates what he sees. A layman sees God and creates. In layman's creative work the notion and the reality are identical. In child's creative work there is the identity of representation and sensory reality, but not the one that Hegel deduced from the concept, but only the pre-existing, given in sensation, in Hegel's categories, but existing exactly where the child takes his first steps in knowing himself - in present being.

The 'stoolness' of the child is not yet the 'spoonness' of the Layman. The character of the dialogues of Nicolas of Cusa seems to anticipate Hegel's words: 'Since knowledge wants to know the true, to know what Being in itself and for itself is, it is not limited to the direct and its definitions, but penetrates through it, on the assumption that behind this Being there is something else than Being itself, and that this background constitutes the truth of Being' [11, p. 7]. Unconsciously, the child also penetrates through being, as if anticipating that the truth of a thing is not in its immediacy, and asks endless 'why'. But even if we answer the child's endless 'why', we still can't bring him to the concept of God. God as the totality of all negations, not God, as the totality of all realities. 'If ... we take reality in its certainty, then in view of the fact that it contains a moment of negativity as something very essential, the totality of all realities also becomes the totality of all negations, the totality of all contradictions' [2, p. 96-97].

The child needs to see the world as a whole. And for this he needs to make a total denial of his activities. But how can he do this? Break all the toys? Trample all the pies? Burn all the stools?

Anyway, some toy will remain unbroken, and some stool unburned. And the child needs to make a total denial to create his beginning.

If you carefully read Kant, you can find that the Koenigsberg thinker is on the path of the child. After all, how does Kant offer the reader to see the space to the reader of 'The Critique of Pure Reason'? 'Gradually take away from your empirical understanding of the object everything which is empirical in it: color, hardness or softness, weight, impermeability; then, however, the space isn't gone, the space which has been previously taken by the object (which has now already completely ceased to exist) and which you can't throw away '[12, p. 44].  Kant's space here is something passive, created by the activity of the researcher - a certain emptiness as a result of activity. But does this emptiness really exist? And in his further works, Kant removes his previous statement ' he now treats the space as a category, a pure contemplation, a condition of experience, the only possibility of experience that does not contain anything. The very category that Hegel subsequently defines as nothing. Nothing that can exist only in the transition to Being. Nothing as an active formative principle. Kant paves the way for such a Hegelian understanding - there is no space in things as such - this category manifests itself only in the activity of the researcher, but at the same time it is already primary, in contrast to the initial premise. Nothing (space) passing into being (the activity of contemplation) gives rise to the present being of the phenomenon.

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