Basic existence of scientific philosophy became the main question of philosophy

Dedicated to the 200th anniversary of F. Engels

Will there be a scientific philosophy in the 21st century: 'to be or not to be' of philosophy in the 21st century? And if so, in what form should the fundamental question of philosophy be and is it relevant? After reading the programmatic article A.S. Chuprov's, 'The Problem of Cognizability of the World in the Light of the Dialectic of Being and Existence' [13] and against the background of the boring works of Russian philosophers, whose highest joy is the joy of mutual quoting and getting into international databases, the question arose: 'Could mocking have penetrated the sphere of philosophical reasoning?' Perhaps, this question was in the faces of rare readers of philosophical journals? Readers are rare, since the political edition of the book series 'What they are working on, what philosophers argue about' was popular in Soviet civilization, where mass philosophical education encompassed everyone. Professional philosophers 70 years ago this book series was ironically called among themselves: "How philosophers went crazy".

Article Chuprov's, in which the basic question of philosophy is denied, is provocative in content and journalistic in form, and restores the Soviet tradition of philosophical discussions. On the eve of the 200th anniversary of F. Engels and a year after the anniversary of K. Marx, the author, denying the very possibility of the basic issue of philosophy, nevertheless puts forward his own main opposition to being and existence. This opposition is important as a way to uncover the question of the cognizability of the world, to create a new dialectic of being and existence, in which the categories of subject and object begin to work differently. And the author is inclined to recognize the unknowability of the world, like the science fiction writer S. Lem, for whom the cosmic and the alien are unknowable. And    adaptation of film by A. Tarkovsky according  to S. Lem to the ethical issues and human choice in the film "Solaris" can be done by "just a fool".

S. Lem spoke: 'I have very fundamental complaints about this film adaptation. Firstly, I would like to see the planet Solaris, but, unfortunately, the director deprived me of this opportunity, since he shot a chamber film. And secondly (and this I told Tarkovsky during one of the quarrels), he did not make a movie "Solaris" at all, but "Crime and Punishment". Indeed, from the film it follows only that this foul Kelvin brought poor Hari to suicide, and then for this reason he was tormented by remorses, which was intensified by her appearance, and the appearance in the circumstances of strange and incomprehensible. This phenomenon of Hari's next appearances was used by me to implement a certain concept that goes back almost to Kant. After all, there is Ding an sich, the unknowable, Thing in itself, the second side, on which is impossible to break through to. And this in my prose was embodied and arranged in a completely different way ... But it was absolutely terrible that Tarkovsky introduced Kelvin's parents into the film, and even one of his aunts. But first of all, it's mother, and 'mother' is 'Russia', 'Motherland', 'Earth'. I was already angry with it" [15, s. 133].

The fiction was entitled to the recognition of Ding an sich. But what is allowed to the writer in interpretations of the picture of the world is not allowed to the philosopher. The latter has such a right, but only as a writer, and not as a representative of scientific philosophy. However, if the author claims that Marxism, like positivism, has lost being and remained without philosophy, we can conclude about the position of the author: obviously, this is not a scientific philosophy in the union of materialistic philosophers and naturalists-scientists. D.A. Salynsky writes: 'The concept of God, tragically experiencing the imperfection of his creations, is not expressed in words in the film, but is given through a visual image that animates the parable. For some people, there is God, for others it is not, but it seems to me that Lem belonged to the first category and, at heart, was not the atheist he claimed to be. I think Tarkovsky revealed the real Lem to the world. The properties of Solaris - omniscience and omnipotence, good and conscience - are traditional attributes of God. If God is impossible in atheistic discourse, then the plot of the novel is also impossible. This is the main contradiction in the interpretation of the novel by Lem, which Tarkovsky revealed in the most cardinal way: he made Lemovsky 'as if God' simply God' [11, p. 20]. And further: 'It seems to me that a certain psychological attitude has also arisen, an unspoken conviction of the absoluteness of one's own knowledge, in published conversations with him it is noticeable as the absence of a critical assessment of one's immense superiority, which may have affected his conflict with Tarkovsky. Only a sense of humor saved him...' [11, p. 21]. And the author of the article, without humor, seriously creates a new philosophical system, or rather, with his new system, destroys the tradition that comes from F. Engels and all of ancient philosophy.

In sensory contemplation, only the singular things are given?

We are told that sensation and experience are opposed to being: and this is correct, but not true. Being is opposed by an undeveloped sensation: sensations are points, sensations are systems, sensations are purely individual. In the words of the hero of the novel by I. S. Turgenev, 'Fathers and children' by Bazarov: 'There are no principles at all - you haven't guessed this yet! - but there are sensations. Everything depends on them ... People will never penetrate deeper than this. Not everyone will tell you this, and I will not tell you this another time'.

Perfectly in the spirit of Bazarov, for thousands of years, philosophers have taught the simple Aristotelian idea that sensed things are individual and external. In the argument of Plato and Aristotle A.S. Chuprov takes a position over the clash between the 'almost materialist' Aristotle and the idealist Plato. The author writes: 'this is a dispute between those who are convinced that it is relations, that is, ideas, that form 'things (there are no relations - there are no things), and those who claim that material things alone lead to the existence of relations among themselves (there are no things - there are no relations between them)' [13, p. 83]. The philosopher claims that the history of classical philosophy with its opposites has ended: 'this is the whole essence of the opposition of idealism and materialism, and not the opposition between the bourgeoisie and workers. Everything else is 'ideological foam' [13, p. 83]. It turns out that "people will never penetrate deeper than this," but in reality it is a liberal ideology's myth, individualism, and sociological nominalism. And Marxism writes about the future as overcoming private property - about the developed sensation of a collective, person and group, class. Then it is not sensation and experience that matters, but the consciousness and ideology of the advanced class. The world is known not by one person in a certain unique moment of it, but all of humanity. Just as the brain does not think, but a man with the help of the brain, and not even man, but humanity through man, because the essence of man is social. And since humanity has been living for millions of years, it obtain sensual experience for millions of years. People in a dream and designing the future use systemic higher dialectic logic - the logic of the Russian dream, the Chinese dream, the American dream. It is fundamentally wrong to reduce sensations and experiences to the reflection of individual parties of things and to a sensed point.

Meanwhile, in the West, three breakthroughs have already been made in understanding sensations and experiences, which people usually do not notice, since sensations are understood in the spirit of metaphysical materialism, in the spirit of Aristotle, in the time when an  experience is understood in the spirit of a subjective-idealistic inner world outlook. Three breakthroughs or three steps from Aristotle were the right steps. So, F. Bacon stopped considering sensations as points, which allowed him to discover the logic of scientific knowledge. K. Marx proved that the 'collective worker' is systematic and omnipresent with his senses, captures not only the instantaneous properties of things, but also builds a system of dialectical logic that reproduces the process of production of surplus value and class struggle. B. Russell showed the danger of Aristotle's logic, which slowed down the development of mankind for two thousand years. In Russia, on the contrary, there were not three breakthroughs, but three kickbacks from the scientific understanding of sensation.

In 1935, Aristotle's logic was introduced into educating. S.L. Rubinstein wrote then: 'From no description, no matter how bright it may be, a blind man does not recognize the colorful world, and a deaf man does not know the musicality of his sounds as if he directly perceived them; no psychological treatise can replace a person who himself has not experienced love, the passion of struggle and the joy of creativity, what he would experience if he himself experienced them. My experiences are given to me differently, as if in a different perspective, than they are given to another. The experiences, thoughts, feelings of the subject are his thoughts, his feelings, these are his experiences - a piece of his own life, in his flesh and blood' [10, p. 6]. In another text: 'If belonging to the individual, to the subject is the first essential sign of the psychic, then his attitude to an object independent of the psyche, from consciousness is another no less essential feature of the psychic. Every psychic phenomenon is differentiated from others and is defined as such and such an experience due to the fact that it is an experience of such and such; his inner nature is revealed through his relation to the outer. The psyche, consciousness reflects an objective reality that exists outside and independently of it; consciousness is a conscious being' [9, p. 6].

S.L. Rubinstein argued that sensory contemplation cognizes only the directly given. Directly in sensory contemplation, only a single is given - separate, isolated ideas and only random, external connections. He wrote: 'However, sensory contemplation is also cognitive, and it reflects objective reality. But sensory contemplation cognizes only the direct. Directly in sensory contemplation, only a single is given - separate, isolated ideas and only random, external connections. Visually, we are always given a segment or a scrap of the world limited by the subjective conditions of our perception. But the world is not ragged, it does not consist of a simple sum of independent direct realities from each other. Objectively, they depend on each other and are determined by each other. When, in perception, in sensory contemplation, we reflect, outside their connection, the individual sides of the object, which are objectively, in itself, inextricably linked internally, we not only incompletely, but also not quite adequately reflect its content' [10, p. 47]. All this is an anti-Hegelian understanding of the comprehension of the world by man. G. Hegel has three methods of comprehension: the fantasies with help that religion comprehends in the world. The images with which the world comprehends art. The concepts with which science allows you to achieve the fullness of knowledge and convey unique and personal understanding to others.

Two Soviet philosophical journals called the ideas of Aristotle-Rubinstein Marxist-Leninist. Aristotle's libel on sensory cognition was given out as a scientific philosophy, and after the war it was presented for study in schools and universities of the country. The views of slave owners are attributed to Lenin. And today, in textbooks, they say that the world is not the way we perceive it. And knowledge is formed from knowledge. Here we are behind the West. One must understand the sensual differently. The author takes traditional materialism and compares it with modern idealism, and this is a childishly monstrous representation. The author describes the existence 'that is given to us in two ways: 1) in sensations, which became the basis of traditional materialism, the essence of which is the identification of Being and matter given to us in sensations; 2) in the human experience of himself, on the basis of which all existentialism is built. And not only. In essence, any kind of idealism (subjective or objective, including religious) is an extrapolation of a person's experience of his existence on everything that exists, the identification of being and thinking, being and sensuality, being and will' [13, p. 82]. He writes further: 'In contrast to the Marxists, phenomenologists (Edmund Husserl and his followers, including existentialists, for example, early M. Heidegger and J.-P. Sartre) focused their efforts on this issue, developing principle of intentionality of consciousness, that is, the orientation of consciousness on an object, in essence, its tendency towards a 'pure' being ... In my opinion, thinkers like Auguste Comte or Karl Popper are outstanding logicians, science experts, sociologists, but people who can only be called philosophers conditionally since tions without metaphysics - is the same nonsense as "dry water"' [13, p. 85].

Subject and his sensations: are collective sensations possible?

Let's move on to 'dry water': it is obvious that a non-isolated and inactive individual feels the world. As noted by Marx, bourgeois science loves robinsonades. Not the individual is the carrier of knowledge, but a sensations subject. Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University V.V. Mironov writes: 'The subject is a source of cognitive activity. Typically, the subject refers to the individual. This is not entirely true. The subject, of course, is primarily an individual with all his cognitive abilities. But the subject is a microgroup, a social group, a class, and a society' [6, p. 163].

At the level of an individual, we are dealing with sensations of the first order (sensations-points) or individual sensations which described in works S.L. Rubinstein, reflect the individual properties of things and phenomena. This feeling is superficial. The acting individual receives sensations-chains, or sensations of the process, which reflect the processes, and therefore already general, essential and necessary. A microgroup, community or a united acting group of people includes sensations of a system that reflect the system of connections of an object. In Russia, a group of previously poorly known with each other people in a region will organize and easily liquidate an emergency. The same thing happens in a foreign resort, where our tourists who do not want to communicate with their compatriots suddenly connect to an active collective entity.

An individual using informational means receives systems of disparate sensations-points, that is, second-order sensations. An individual uses ready-made reflections of processes transmitted through information tools by other people. This is a phenomenon of selfie in unusual conditions. A social group, groups, class, and society, people and humanity deal with collective sensations that reflect the endless wealth of the developing world. And organized groups of deceivers and terrorists, fake producers, acting to deceive people and groups, in a systematic deception create and disseminate third-order deceptive sensations, both individual and systemic, in order to stupefy, introducing individuals and groups into deception. Finally, fourth-order sensations exposing deception and systematic lies. In these sensations, an individual acts who has discovered falsehood and began to reveal something hidden. A difference is found between what was affirmed and what is actually. A group of individuals verifies the utterance system using a causal relationship system similar to the Nuremberg Tribunal. All enlightened people and humanity, armed with knowledge of the falsehoods in the world, feel all the information on this object - that which has been felt so far and that which can be known today [7, p. 167-168].

It is clear that the question is not about saving thinking and the convenience of distinguishing materialism and idealism. The author, simplifying, writes: 'It is impossible not to admit that the division of philosophers proposed by Engels into materialists and idealists is a rather convenient classification of philosophers from the educational and methodological point of view...' [13, p. 83]. The question that arouze is actually about the survival of mankind, its freedom and mastery of the elemental forces of nature and society. But does Being disappear? Being remains the social reality of a united humanity.

And here not being determines consciousness, but social being determines social consciousness. That is the absolute truth. However, all of those who have undergone a university course of philosophy, for some reason, believe that being determines human consciousness. They are asked, where did You read this? They do not say, just easier to consider that Being determines consciousness. The person himself determines the upbringing and circumstances of life. Otherwise, why would the bourgeois intelligent K. Marx become the ideologist of the proletariat, the capitalist F. Engels moved to the position of those whom he exploited, and the nobleman V.I. Lenin became the leader of the factory working class and proclaimed the State of the dictatorship of the proletariat? And why did the Russian reenactor, an adorer of Napoleon, become a deconstructor-dismemberer, why did the psychiatric departments of the clinics clogged with 'Napoleons' for two centuries?

Change in social being and the question of existence

Today, the popularity of the ideas of Marxism is refuted by the forecast of F. Fukuyama about the 'end of history' and the establishment of global capitalist domination. However, other forecasts are adjusted. R. Vakhitov wrote in an article in memory of the Marxist I. Wallerstein: 'Wallerstein, by the way, was keenly interested in the fate of post-Soviet Russia. He predicted that by 2050, none other than Vladimir Ilyich Lenin would become the most popular national hero in Russia. Because it was Lenin who showed the countries of the semi-periphery and periphery the path to liberation from the fetters of world capitalism, into which Russia fell for the second time in its history. Wallerstein made a mistake only in terms - now, on the threshold of the 2020s, the popularity of Lenin and Stalin among ordinary Russians is breaking all records...' [1].

Real life can bring down any predictions, because the baton of the world revolution is transmitted from one country to another. And the USSR is not the leader of the world revolutionary process, but there is the PRC - red China. And not 300 million people are members of the World Socialist System, CMEA and the Warsaw Treaty, as before, but one and a half billion people, that is, five times as many. If we compare the territories and economic power of the renewed World Socialist System, the picture is more impressive.

The Lenins call at the Third Congress of the RKSM is well-known: 'to study, study and study'. This refers to learning communism, since one can become a communist only by enriching one's memory with knowledge of all the wealth developed by mankind. I.V. Stalin subsequently at the VIII Congress of the Komsomol specified that it is especially important to learn from enemies. He said: 'To build, you need to know, you need to master science. And in order to know, we must learn. Learn hard, patiently. Learn from everyone - from enemies and friends, especially from enemies. "Learning, gritting your teeth, not afraid that the enemies will laugh at us, at our ignorance, at our backwardness" [12, p. 76]. Thus, history repeats itself: the question is about training new personnel for the updated world socialist system, about the philosophy necessary for the world to learn and transform the progressive class and its civilization.

In these conditions of humanity development, is there no difference between being and non-being? Is it not clear that the secrets of being are knowable and will be known? What If an existence for a materialist does not situated at the level of being? It's impossible. Since the philosophy of Marxism, according to V.I. Lenin, there is materialism, the author avoids Marxism and avoids consistent materialism, avoids even the formulation of historical materialism or historical idealism. This suggests that there are only two options, and that the author ultimately is idealist and he is ashamed to admit it. He is looking for a third line, and yet everyone who is looking for a third line in philosophy is muddler and opportunist, and also a supporter of metaphysical mess instead of philosophy.

The philosophy of Marxism back in the 19th century outlived formal logic and philosophical metaphysical materialism, which since then began to be perceived as backwardness. The philosophy of Marxism has gone forward and is awaiting advanced thinkers, scientists, and natural scientists. Marxism in the twentieth century has justified itself - the dictatorship of the proletariat or Soviet power as its second historical form has shown that without class dictatorship there is no socialism. 'We thought dialectics not according to Hegel', wrote the Soviet poet, but it was necessary to study dialectics exactly according to Hegel.

A modest and immodest assumption of world and spirit

After entering the Faculty of Philosophy, the author of this article received the first task of the supervisor to translate the works of the XIV World Philosophical Congress just held in 1968 inVienna. The first article-report from the plenary session was so amazing that it became a guide to the world of Western thinking, Western philosophy and made the author a historian of philosophy. This article is 'A Modest Proposal concerning Spirit and the World' by American John Lax of Vanderbilt University. D. Lax writes in his 'humble assumption' that only an inveterate materialist will deny the existence of spirit. There are those who deny the existence of the world or recognize its existence as a sequence of thoughts in one's mind. It is interesting to study dialectically the consequences of such a view, since in this 'verbal feat' of idealistic reduction nothing changes except the name. Therefore, as a prerequisite for research, we should take the natural confidence of an animal and a living being in the existence of the real world and the conviction of self-contemplating and a cognizing person in the real flow of his feelings and thoughts. In light of the foregoing, a model of the relation of the world to the spirit, accepted in Western philosophical tradition, is subject to criticism. According to this theory, the world is a created, but not creative prerequisite for spiritual action. It is argued that matter is incapable of movement and self-development, and therefore needs consciousness as a source of development.

In the form of this hypothesis, which D. Lax accepts as 'our paradigm', a parallel can be traced between the cosmic creation of matter from the side of the supreme personality - God and the microsmic control activity of the spirit at the personality level. Both acts through the human mind. God creates the world, just as the human mind creates the body. However, unlike man, God does not need material for his activity - he creates ex nihilo [16, p. 92].

D. Lax proceeds from the attitude that the world exists and that it is real. V.I. Lenin counted this is naive realism and even spontaneous materialism at the level of the ancient Greeks. Idealism is rejected here, but only subjective idealism. D. Lax is perhaps an objective idealist who rejects primitive materialism not recognizing spirit and consciousness as a whole. But then he criticizes metaphysical materialism, which believes that matter does not move and is inert, and therefore assumes the existence of God as a driving force. Lenin's phrase about G. Hegel "He feels sorry for God!! Idealistic bastard!!' in this case refers not so much to idealists, but primarily to metaphysical materialists [3, p. 267].

After all, Lenin quotes Hegel's phrase about Epicurus: 'Epicurus does not have... the ultimate goal of peace, the wisdom of the creator. There is nothing but incidents that are determined by a random (??) external (??) collision of combinations of atoms'... [3, p. 267] Let us recall the theme of K. Marx's doctoral dissertation 'On the difference between the natural philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus'. Lenin understands Hegel according to F. Engels: 'Engels was right that Hegel's system was inverted materialism' [3, p. 215]. Before that, Lenin writes that 'a more consistent idealist clutches at God!' [3, p. 152]. And he explains: 'In general, I try to read Hegel in a materialist sence: Hegel is materialism stating on head (according to Engels) - that is, I mostly throw away God, the absolute, the pure idea etc.' [3, p. 93].

D. Lax, thus, demonstrates the whole paradigm layout of the Basic Question of Philosophy (BQPh) in the Western tradition. How he will continue to solve the problem he poses does not currently concern us. It is only clear that the paradigm of the Basic Question of Philosophy by default continues to exist in the Western philosophical tradition.

In contrast to the Western tradition A.S. Chuprov's insist on opposing of being not to consciousness, but to certain existence. F. Engels in his pamphlet 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' indicates that, in the language of old philosophy, thinking is opposed to being. He offers a pair of being and consciousness. And the young K. Marx writes about the same thing - social being determines social consciousness. But already in Lenin's works appears matter and consciousness: objective reality and subjective reality. And, based on the Leninist theory of reflection, M.N. Rutkevich formulates - there is an objective reality outside the audience's window and a subjective reality in our head, and cognition is a reflection of one in the other. There is objective being and subjective being, and as V.V. Orlov writes - what precedes what, what reflects what, and what is the carrier of what?

Three components of phase conjugation are recorded by V.V. Orlov: 'The first, or main, question of philosophy, according to F. Engels, is the question of the relation of consciousness to matter, or, in somewhat outdated terms, spirit to nature, thinking to being. The main content and meaning of this question was described by Engels in the brochure Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886). The main issue of philosophy (BQPh) has a complex structure, which leads to a wide variety of levels or sides.

Considering the first, most fundamental level of phase conjugation, Engels distinguished two sides in it. The first side of the question of the relation of consciousness to matter is the question of what is primary - matter or consciousness, and, accordingly, which of them acts as secondary, derivative, dependent. The concept of primacy has three interconnected meanings in philosophy: 1) what exists first, i.e. what precedes what, 2) what is a property or manifestation of another: consciousness belongs to highly organized matter, or, conversely, the latter is a manifestation of consciousness, 3) what reflects another', consciousness reflects the material world external to it, or matter is a reflection of some spirit. Often a different formulation of the question of primary-secondary is used: what is the basis of the world: matter or consciousness" [8, p. 8].

It is known that every philosopher solves his personal problems by choosing a particular topic. If we ignore each author as a person, then we should come to an understanding of the situation of the broad masses, who, due to idealism and religion, also solve their personal and social issues. A. Gramsci wrote about this: 'Awareness by the broad masses of their material impotence in the face of few oppressors leads to the exaltation of purely spiritual values, etc., to passivity, to non-resistance, to non-cooperation, which nevertheless are protection, but protection weak and difficult, like protecting by a mattress from bullets' [2, p. 312].

Ten Questions to Philosophers

It remains to ask ten questions to any philosopher who wants to be modern. These questions will be asked in the style of Lenin's "Ten Questions to the Referent." Professional philosophers should remember these one and a half pages of text sent to Geneva at a critical moment in the party discussion on the definition of philosophical principles for the new century.

A positive (correct, in our opinion) answer to these questions will return philosophy to minds and social reality; negative answers to the test will reliably determine the degree to which representatives of the philosophical community fall to zero. Call it the level in the range from 1 to 10.

1. Does the author recognize the basic monistic division of philosophical systems into materialism and idealism?

2. Does the author acknowledge that the middle fluctuating line between materialism and idealism is agnosticism based on solipsism and subjective idealism, and versions of neo-Kantianism (including sociology and phenomenological sociology of cognition) are a form of agnosticism?

3. Does the author acknowledge that the existing external world is reflected in the human head, and the correctness of this reflection is verified and achieved through socio-historical practice?

4. Does the author acknowledge that the world is fundamentally cognizable for man and humanity and that there are only differences between what is known and what is not yet known?

5. Does the author recognize that the real unity of the world lies in its materiality and that there is nothing supranaturalistic and, therefore, the so-called 'artificial intelligence' is impossible?

6. Does the author acknowledge that matter without motion is as unthinkable as motion without matter, and space and time are attributes of matter?

7. Does the author recognize that truth is the correspondence of scientific knowledge to an object as a result of the reflection of the laws of nature and the real world in the minds of people and in the public consciousness?

8. Does the author recognize that social matter, or objective social relations, determines the public consciousness of people, or vice versa - do social representations define the metric of social heterology?

9. Does the author acknowledge that existing classes and class interests form human cognition and, therefore, the doctrine of pluralism and tolerance, idealism and religion are reactionary in nature and mask the interests of classes that are disappearing?

10. Does the author acknowledge that the theories of post-industrialism are conceptually and practically untenable, since they require a reduction in the world's population, sustainable development, income from nature and redistribution of income in favor of rich countries and the international financial oligarchy, and not from science and social production?

How exist a scientific philosophy?

Philosophy today exists in a special reality, which we will designate as the 'ideological apparatus of the state' (IAS). It would seem that philosophy exists outside the state repressive apparatus, but the philosophy of postmodernity (using the ideas of the French Marxist L. Althusser is presented in the religious IAS (a system of various churches); educational IAS (system of public and private "schools"); family IAS; legal IAS; political IAS (political system with parties); trade union IAS; Information IAS (media cartels); cultural IAS (literature, art, sports). We are talking about many bourgeois ideological apparatus if the unified state suppression apparatus entirely belongs to the public sphere, while most of the ideological apparatuses of the state belong to the private sphere. This is the terminology we borrowed from the French Marxist L. Althusser from an article we published [14].  

Obviously, the main difference between state apparatus (of suppression) and IAS is as follows: the state apparatus (of suppression) "operates through violence", while the state ideological apparatus operates "through ideology". Postmodern philosophy exists in the interval between science and ideology, and therefore acts as a politics and hides the political origin of the heuristic quest for truth. However, the identification of this fact suggests the inevitability of the formation of an up-to-date philosophy, which stands on the positions of militant materialism and expresses the interests of the opposite side in the IAS - the side of the oppressed people, their self-governing organizations and the natural emancipators of humanity.

The request for a new scientific philosophy becomes again relevant, within the framework of which philosophy finds material weapons in the aggregate proletariat, and the proletariat discovers spiritual weapons in philosophy. The true development of philosophy begins as an antagonist of the ideological mystified products of the ideological apparatuses of the late bourgeois state, which arose as a result of a series of counter-revolutionary coups. From this point on, engaging in philosophy means carrying out a revolution in the minds, preparing for the return of the revolutionary tide in society, smashing the mold of the post-modernist project in culture, overcoming the remnants of the bourgeois-humanist storm of the first socialist society in history. For the working people of the planet, in the face of the Western model of globalization, the demand for philosophy becomes absolute in the conditions of the domination of the mystification curtain over the prospects for the development of society hanged by the manipulators of the ideological apparatuses of the bourgeois state.

In the 'German ideology', K. Marx demetaphorizes the concept of 'world spirit', under this is the 'world market': 'In the preceding history, it is also an unconditional empirical fact that certain individuals, as their activities expand to world-historical activities, more and more fell under the power of an alien force (in this oppression they saw the machinations of the so-called world spirit, etc.) - under the power of power, which is becoming increasingly widespread and ultimately manifests itself as a world market' [5, p. 36]. And further: 'Comprehensive dependence, this spontaneously formed form of world-historical joint activity of individuals, is transformed, thanks to the communist revolution, into control and conscious domination of forces that, being generated by the influence of people on each other, still seemed to them completely alien forces and as such dominated them. Again, this view can be interpreted speculatively idealistic, that is, fantastically, as 'self-generation of the genus' ('society as a subject'), imagining the whole series of consecutive and interconnected individuals as a single individual committing the sacrament of procreation of oneself. It is found here that although individuals both physically and spiritually create each other, they, however, do not create themselves either in the spirit of the nonsense of St. Bruno, or in the sense of the 'One', 'created' person. Thus, this understanding of history consists in considering, proceeding from the material production of direct life, the actual process of production...' [5, p. 36].

The French Marxist S. Mercier-José in her book 'To read Hegel and Marx' writes that history is not a history of people, it is a history of production methods. [17, p. 31] Therefore, one should never forget about the class struggle, as Chairman Mao Zedong urged. Back in 1937, he wrote in the work 'Regarding Practice. About the connection between knowledge and practice - the connection between knowledge and action", that "pre-Marxist materialism considered the issues of knowledge in isolation from the social nature of people, in isolation from the historical development of mankind and therefore could not understand the dependence of knowledge on social practice, that is, the dependence of knowledge on production and class struggle" [4, p. 379].

V.I. Lenin in the abstract of G. Hegel's book 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy' especially emphasizes the comparison of the history of philosophy with the circle and quotes: 'this circle has a great many circles around its edges.' V.I. Lenin in the margins remarks: 'A very deep, true comparison!! Every shade of thought = a circle on a great circle (spiral) of the development of human thought in general'[3, p. 221]. The foregoing means that all new circles on the great circle are useful, since they allow us to rethink the main issue, which has become, ultimately, the main issue and the imperative of the existence of scientific philosophy.

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