Basic existence of scientific philosophy became the main question of philosophy
Table of contents: The Kazakh-American Free University Academic Journal №11 - 2019
Author: Nekrasov Stanislav, Ural Federal University named after the first president of Russia B.N. Yeltsin, professor, Ural State Agrarian University, Chief Researcher, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Ekaterinburg, Russia
Dedicated to the 200th anniversary of F. Engels
Will there be a scientific
philosophy in the 21st century: 'to be or not to be' of philosophy in the 21st
century? And if so, in what form should the fundamental question of philosophy
be and is it relevant? After reading the programmatic article A.S. Chuprov's,
'The Problem of Cognizability of the World in the Light of the Dialectic of
Being and Existence'  and against the background of the boring works of
Russian philosophers, whose highest joy is the joy of mutual quoting and
getting into international databases, the question arose: 'Could mocking have
penetrated the sphere of philosophical reasoning?' Perhaps, this question was
in the faces of rare readers of philosophical journals? Readers are rare, since
the political edition of the book series 'What they are working on, what
philosophers argue about' was popular in Soviet civilization, where mass
philosophical education encompassed everyone. Professional philosophers 70
years ago this book series was ironically called among themselves: "How
philosophers went crazy".
Article Chuprov's, in which the
basic question of philosophy is denied, is provocative in content and
journalistic in form, and restores the Soviet tradition of philosophical
discussions. On the eve of the 200th anniversary of F. Engels and a year after
the anniversary of K. Marx, the author, denying the very possibility of the
basic issue of philosophy, nevertheless puts forward his own main opposition to
being and existence. This opposition is important as a way to uncover the
question of the cognizability of the world, to create a new dialectic of being
and existence, in which the categories of subject and object begin to work
differently. And the author is inclined to recognize the unknowability of the
world, like the science fiction writer S. Lem, for whom the cosmic and the
alien are unknowable. And adaptation of film by A. Tarkovsky
according to S. Lem to the ethical issues and human choice in the film
"Solaris" can be done by "just a fool".
S. Lem spoke: 'I have very
fundamental complaints about this film adaptation. Firstly, I would like to see
the planet Solaris, but, unfortunately, the director deprived me of this
opportunity, since he shot a chamber film. And secondly (and this I told
Tarkovsky during one of the quarrels), he did not make a movie "Solaris"
at all, but "Crime and Punishment". Indeed, from the film it follows
only that this foul Kelvin brought poor Hari to suicide, and then for this
reason he was tormented by remorses, which was intensified by her appearance,
and the appearance in the circumstances of strange and incomprehensible. This
phenomenon of Hari's next appearances was used by me to implement a certain
concept that goes back almost to Kant. After all, there is Ding an sich, the
unknowable, Thing in itself, the second side, on which is impossible to break
through to. And this in my prose was embodied and arranged in a completely
different way ... But it was absolutely terrible that Tarkovsky introduced
Kelvin's parents into the film, and even one of his aunts. But first of all,
it's mother, and 'mother' is 'Russia',
'Motherland', 'Earth'. I was already angry with it" [15, s. 133].
The fiction was entitled to the
recognition of Ding an sich. But what is allowed to the writer in
interpretations of the picture of the world is not allowed to the philosopher.
The latter has such a right, but only as a writer, and not as a representative
of scientific philosophy. However, if the author claims that Marxism, like
positivism, has lost being and remained without philosophy, we can conclude
about the position of the author: obviously, this is not a scientific
philosophy in the union of materialistic philosophers and
naturalists-scientists. D.A. Salynsky writes: 'The concept of God, tragically
experiencing the imperfection of his creations, is not expressed in words in
the film, but is given through a visual image that animates the parable. For
some people, there is God, for others it is not, but it seems to me that Lem
belonged to the first category and, at heart, was not the atheist he claimed to
be. I think Tarkovsky revealed the real Lem to the world. The properties of
Solaris - omniscience and omnipotence, good and conscience - are traditional
attributes of God. If God is impossible in atheistic discourse, then the plot
of the novel is also impossible. This is the main contradiction in the
interpretation of the novel by Lem, which Tarkovsky revealed in the most
cardinal way: he made Lemovsky 'as if God' simply God' [11, p. 20]. And
further: 'It seems to me that a certain psychological attitude has also arisen,
an unspoken conviction of the absoluteness of one's own knowledge, in published
conversations with him it is noticeable as the absence of a critical assessment
of one's immense superiority, which may have affected his conflict with
Tarkovsky. Only a sense of humor saved him...' [11, p. 21]. And the author of
the article, without humor, seriously creates a new philosophical system, or
rather, with his new system, destroys the tradition that comes from F. Engels
and all of ancient philosophy.
In sensory contemplation, only the singular
things are given?
We are told that sensation and
experience are opposed to being: and this is correct, but not true. Being is
opposed by an undeveloped sensation: sensations are points, sensations are
systems, sensations are purely individual. In the words of the hero of the
novel by I. S. Turgenev, 'Fathers and children' by Bazarov: 'There are no
principles at all - you haven't guessed this yet! - but there are sensations.
Everything depends on them ... People will never penetrate deeper than this.
Not everyone will tell you this, and I will not tell you this another time'.
Perfectly in the spirit of Bazarov,
for thousands of years, philosophers have taught the simple Aristotelian idea
that sensed things are individual and external. In the argument of Plato and
Aristotle A.S. Chuprov takes a position over the clash between the 'almost
materialist' Aristotle and the idealist Plato. The author writes: 'this is a
dispute between those who are convinced that it is relations, that is, ideas,
that form 'things (there are no relations - there are no things), and those who
claim that material things alone lead to the existence of relations among
themselves (there are no things - there are no relations between them)' [13, p.
83]. The philosopher claims that the history of classical philosophy with its
opposites has ended: 'this is the whole essence of the opposition of idealism
and materialism, and not the opposition between the bourgeoisie and workers.
Everything else is 'ideological foam' [13, p. 83]. It turns out that
"people will never penetrate deeper than this," but in reality it is
a liberal ideology's myth, individualism, and sociological nominalism. And
Marxism writes about the future as overcoming private property - about the developed
sensation of a collective, person and group, class. Then it is not sensation
and experience that matters, but the consciousness and ideology of the advanced
class. The world is known not by one person in a certain unique moment of it,
but all of humanity. Just as the brain does not think, but a man with the help
of the brain, and not even man, but humanity through man, because the essence
of man is social. And since humanity has been living for millions of years, it
obtain sensual experience for millions of years. People in a dream and
designing the future use systemic higher dialectic logic - the logic of the
Russian dream, the Chinese dream, the American dream. It is fundamentally wrong
to reduce sensations and experiences to the reflection of individual parties of
things and to a sensed point.
Meanwhile, in the West, three
breakthroughs have already been made in understanding sensations and
experiences, which people usually do not notice, since sensations are
understood in the spirit of metaphysical materialism, in the spirit of
Aristotle, in the time when an experience is understood in the spirit of
a subjective-idealistic inner world outlook. Three breakthroughs or three steps
from Aristotle were the right steps. So, F. Bacon stopped considering
sensations as points, which allowed him to discover the logic of scientific
knowledge. K. Marx proved that the 'collective worker' is systematic and
omnipresent with his senses, captures not only the instantaneous properties of
things, but also builds a system of dialectical logic that reproduces the
process of production of surplus value and class struggle. B. Russell showed
the danger of Aristotle's logic, which slowed down the development of mankind
for two thousand years. In Russia,
on the contrary, there were not three breakthroughs, but three kickbacks from
the scientific understanding of sensation.
In 1935, Aristotle's logic was
introduced into educating. S.L. Rubinstein wrote then: 'From no description, no
matter how bright it may be, a blind man does not recognize the colorful world,
and a deaf man does not know the musicality of his sounds as if he directly
perceived them; no psychological treatise can replace a person who himself has
not experienced love, the passion of struggle and the joy of creativity, what
he would experience if he himself experienced them. My experiences are given to
me differently, as if in a different perspective, than they are given to
another. The experiences, thoughts, feelings of the subject are his thoughts,
his feelings, these are his experiences - a piece of his own life, in his flesh
and blood' [10, p. 6]. In another text: 'If belonging to the individual, to the
subject is the first essential sign of the psychic, then his attitude to an
object independent of the psyche, from consciousness is another no less
essential feature of the psychic. Every psychic phenomenon is differentiated
from others and is defined as such and such an experience due to the fact that
it is an experience of such and such; his inner nature is revealed through his
relation to the outer. The psyche, consciousness reflects an objective reality
that exists outside and independently of it; consciousness is a conscious
being' [9, p. 6].
S.L. Rubinstein argued that sensory
contemplation cognizes only the directly given. Directly in sensory
contemplation, only a single is given - separate, isolated ideas and only
random, external connections. He wrote: 'However, sensory contemplation is also
cognitive, and it reflects objective reality. But sensory contemplation
cognizes only the direct. Directly in sensory contemplation, only a single is
given - separate, isolated ideas and only random, external connections.
Visually, we are always given a segment or a scrap of the world limited by the
subjective conditions of our perception. But the world is not ragged, it does
not consist of a simple sum of independent direct realities from each other.
Objectively, they depend on each other and are determined by each other. When,
in perception, in sensory contemplation, we reflect, outside their connection,
the individual sides of the object, which are objectively, in itself,
inextricably linked internally, we not only incompletely, but also not quite
adequately reflect its content' [10, p. 47]. All this is an anti-Hegelian
understanding of the comprehension of the world by man. G. Hegel has three
methods of comprehension: the fantasies with help that religion comprehends in
the world. The images with which the world comprehends art. The concepts with
which science allows you to achieve the fullness of knowledge and convey unique
and personal understanding to others.
Two Soviet philosophical journals
called the ideas of Aristotle-Rubinstein Marxist-Leninist. Aristotle's libel on
sensory cognition was given out as a scientific philosophy, and after the war
it was presented for study in schools and universities of the country. The
views of slave owners are attributed to Lenin. And today, in textbooks, they
say that the world is not the way we perceive it. And knowledge is formed from
knowledge. Here we are behind the West. One must understand the sensual
differently. The author takes traditional materialism and compares it with
modern idealism, and this is a childishly monstrous representation. The author
describes the existence 'that is given to us in two ways: 1) in sensations,
which became the basis of traditional materialism, the essence of which is the
identification of Being and matter given to us in sensations; 2) in the human
experience of himself, on the basis of which all existentialism is built. And
not only. In essence, any kind of idealism (subjective or objective, including
religious) is an extrapolation of a person's experience of his existence on
everything that exists, the identification of being and thinking, being and
sensuality, being and will' [13, p. 82]. He writes further: 'In contrast to the
Marxists, phenomenologists (Edmund Husserl and his followers, including
existentialists, for example, early M. Heidegger and J.-P. Sartre) focused
their efforts on this issue, developing principle of intentionality of
consciousness, that is, the orientation of consciousness on an object, in
essence, its tendency towards a 'pure' being ... In my opinion, thinkers like
Auguste Comte or Karl Popper are outstanding logicians, science experts,
sociologists, but people who can only be called philosophers conditionally
since tions without metaphysics - is the same nonsense as "dry
water"' [13, p. 85].
Subject and his sensations: are collective
Let's move on to 'dry water': it is
obvious that a non-isolated and inactive individual feels the world. As noted
by Marx, bourgeois science loves robinsonades. Not the individual is the
carrier of knowledge, but a sensations subject. Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy
of Moscow State University V.V. Mironov writes: 'The subject is a source of
cognitive activity. Typically, the subject refers to the individual. This is
not entirely true. The subject, of course, is primarily an individual with all
his cognitive abilities. But the subject is a microgroup, a social group, a
class, and a society' [6, p. 163].
At the level of an individual, we
are dealing with sensations of the first order (sensations-points) or
individual sensations which described in works S.L. Rubinstein, reflect the
individual properties of things and phenomena. This feeling is superficial. The
acting individual receives sensations-chains, or sensations of the process,
which reflect the processes, and therefore already general, essential and
necessary. A microgroup, community or a united acting group of people includes
sensations of a system that reflect the system of connections of an object. In Russia, a group
of previously poorly known with each other people in a region will organize and
easily liquidate an emergency. The same thing happens in a foreign resort,
where our tourists who do not want to communicate with their compatriots
suddenly connect to an active collective entity.
An individual using informational
means receives systems of disparate sensations-points, that is, second-order
sensations. An individual uses ready-made reflections of processes transmitted
through information tools by other people. This is a phenomenon of selfie in
unusual conditions. A social group, groups, class, and society, people and
humanity deal with collective sensations that reflect the endless wealth of the
developing world. And organized groups of deceivers and terrorists, fake
producers, acting to deceive people and groups, in a systematic deception
create and disseminate third-order deceptive sensations, both individual and
systemic, in order to stupefy, introducing individuals and groups into
deception. Finally, fourth-order sensations exposing deception and systematic
lies. In these sensations, an individual acts who has discovered falsehood and
began to reveal something hidden. A difference is found between what was
affirmed and what is actually. A group of individuals verifies the utterance
system using a causal relationship system similar to the Nuremberg Tribunal.
All enlightened people and humanity, armed with knowledge of the falsehoods in
the world, feel all the information on this object - that which has been felt
so far and that which can be known today [7, p. 167-168].
It is clear that the question is not
about saving thinking and the convenience of distinguishing materialism and
idealism. The author, simplifying, writes: 'It is impossible not to admit that
the division of philosophers proposed by Engels into materialists and idealists
is a rather convenient classification of philosophers from the educational and
methodological point of view...' [13, p. 83]. The question that arouze is
actually about the survival of mankind, its freedom and mastery of the
elemental forces of nature and society. But does Being disappear? Being remains
the social reality of a united humanity.
And here not being determines
consciousness, but social being determines social consciousness. That is the
absolute truth. However, all of those who have undergone a university course of
philosophy, for some reason, believe that being determines human consciousness.
They are asked, where did You read this? They do not say, just easier to
consider that Being determines consciousness. The person himself determines the
upbringing and circumstances of life. Otherwise, why would the bourgeois
intelligent K. Marx become the ideologist of the proletariat, the capitalist F.
Engels moved to the position of those whom he exploited, and the nobleman V.I.
Lenin became the leader of the factory working class and proclaimed the State
of the dictatorship of the proletariat? And why did the Russian reenactor, an
adorer of Napoleon, become a deconstructor-dismemberer, why did the psychiatric
departments of the clinics clogged with 'Napoleons' for two centuries?
Change in social being and the question of
Today, the popularity of the ideas
of Marxism is refuted by the forecast of F. Fukuyama about the 'end of history'
and the establishment of global capitalist domination. However, other forecasts
are adjusted. R. Vakhitov wrote in an article in memory of the Marxist I.
Wallerstein: 'Wallerstein, by the way, was keenly interested in the fate of
He predicted that by 2050, none other than Vladimir Ilyich Lenin would become
the most popular national hero in Russia. Because it was Lenin who
showed the countries of the semi-periphery and periphery the path to liberation
from the fetters of world capitalism, into which Russia fell for the second time in
its history. Wallerstein made a mistake only in terms - now, on the threshold
of the 2020s, the popularity of Lenin and Stalin among ordinary Russians is
breaking all records...' .
Real life can bring down any
predictions, because the baton of the world revolution is transmitted from one
country to another. And the USSR
is not the leader of the world revolutionary process, but there is the PRC -
And not 300 million people are members of the World Socialist System, CMEA and
the Warsaw Treaty, as before, but one and a half billion people, that is, five
times as many. If we compare the territories and economic power of the renewed
World Socialist System, the picture is more impressive.
The Lenins call at the Third
Congress of the RKSM is well-known: 'to study, study and study'. This refers to
learning communism, since one can become a communist only by enriching one's
memory with knowledge of all the wealth developed by mankind. I.V. Stalin
subsequently at the VIII Congress of the Komsomol specified that it is
especially important to learn from enemies. He said: 'To build, you need to
know, you need to master science. And in order to know, we must learn. Learn
hard, patiently. Learn from everyone - from enemies and friends, especially from
enemies. "Learning, gritting your teeth, not afraid that the enemies will
laugh at us, at our ignorance, at our backwardness" [12, p. 76]. Thus,
history repeats itself: the question is about training new personnel for the
updated world socialist system, about the philosophy necessary for the world to
learn and transform the progressive class and its civilization.
In these conditions of humanity
development, is there no difference between being and non-being? Is it not
clear that the secrets of being are knowable and will be known? What If an
existence for a materialist does not situated at the level of being? It's
impossible. Since the philosophy of Marxism, according to V.I. Lenin, there is
materialism, the author avoids Marxism and avoids consistent materialism,
avoids even the formulation of historical materialism or historical idealism.
This suggests that there are only two options, and that the author ultimately
is idealist and he is ashamed to admit it. He is looking for a third line, and
yet everyone who is looking for a third line in philosophy is muddler and
opportunist, and also a supporter of metaphysical mess instead of philosophy.
The philosophy of Marxism back in
the 19th century outlived formal logic and philosophical metaphysical
materialism, which since then began to be perceived as backwardness. The
philosophy of Marxism has gone forward and is awaiting advanced thinkers,
scientists, and natural scientists. Marxism in the twentieth century has
justified itself - the dictatorship of the proletariat or Soviet power as its
second historical form has shown that without class dictatorship there is no
socialism. 'We thought dialectics not according to Hegel', wrote the Soviet
poet, but it was necessary to study dialectics exactly according to Hegel.
A modest and immodest assumption of world and
After entering the Faculty of
Philosophy, the author of this article received the first task of the
supervisor to translate the works of the XIV World Philosophical Congress just
held in 1968 inVienna. The
first article-report from the plenary session was so amazing that it became a
guide to the world of Western thinking, Western philosophy and made the author
a historian of philosophy. This article is 'A Modest Proposal concerning Spirit
and the World' by American John Lax of Vanderbilt University.
D. Lax writes in his 'humble assumption' that only an inveterate materialist
will deny the existence of spirit. There are those who deny the existence of
the world or recognize its existence as a sequence of thoughts in one's mind.
It is interesting to study dialectically the consequences of such a view, since
in this 'verbal feat' of idealistic reduction nothing changes except the name.
Therefore, as a prerequisite for research, we should take the natural
confidence of an animal and a living being in the existence of the real world
and the conviction of self-contemplating and a cognizing person in the real
flow of his feelings and thoughts. In light of the foregoing, a model of the
relation of the world to the spirit, accepted in Western philosophical
tradition, is subject to criticism. According to this theory, the world is a
created, but not creative prerequisite for spiritual action. It is argued that matter
is incapable of movement and self-development, and therefore needs
consciousness as a source of development.
In the form of this hypothesis,
which D. Lax accepts as 'our paradigm', a parallel can be traced between the
cosmic creation of matter from the side of the supreme personality - God and
the microsmic control activity of the spirit at the personality level. Both
acts through the human mind. God creates the world, just as the human mind
creates the body. However, unlike man, God does not need material for his
activity - he creates ex nihilo [16, p. 92].
D. Lax proceeds from the attitude
that the world exists and that it is real. V.I. Lenin counted this is naive
realism and even spontaneous materialism at the level of the ancient Greeks.
Idealism is rejected here, but only subjective idealism. D. Lax is perhaps an
objective idealist who rejects primitive materialism not recognizing spirit and
consciousness as a whole. But then he criticizes metaphysical materialism,
which believes that matter does not move and is inert, and therefore assumes
the existence of God as a driving force. Lenin's phrase about G. Hegel "He
feels sorry for God!! Idealistic bastard!!' in this case refers not so much to
idealists, but primarily to metaphysical materialists [3, p. 267].
After all, Lenin quotes Hegel's
phrase about Epicurus: 'Epicurus does not have... the ultimate goal of peace,
the wisdom of the creator. There is nothing but incidents that are determined
by a random (??) external (??) collision of combinations of atoms'... [3, p.
267] Let us recall the theme of K. Marx's doctoral dissertation 'On the
difference between the natural philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus'. Lenin
understands Hegel according to F. Engels: 'Engels was right that Hegel's system
was inverted materialism' [3, p. 215]. Before that, Lenin writes that 'a more
consistent idealist clutches at God!' [3, p. 152]. And he explains: 'In
general, I try to read Hegel in a materialist sence: Hegel is materialism
stating on head (according to Engels) - that is, I mostly throw away God, the
absolute, the pure idea etc.' [3, p. 93].
D. Lax, thus, demonstrates the whole
paradigm layout of the Basic Question of Philosophy (BQPh) in the Western
tradition. How he will continue to solve the problem he poses does not
currently concern us. It is only clear that the paradigm of the Basic Question
of Philosophy by default continues to exist in the Western philosophical
In contrast to the Western tradition
A.S. Chuprov's insist on opposing of being not to consciousness, but to certain
existence. F. Engels in his pamphlet 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical
German Philosophy' indicates that, in the language of old philosophy, thinking
is opposed to being. He offers a pair of being and consciousness. And the young
K. Marx writes about the same thing - social being determines social
consciousness. But already in Lenin's works appears matter and consciousness:
objective reality and subjective reality. And, based on the Leninist theory of
reflection, M.N. Rutkevich formulates - there is an objective reality outside
the audience's window and a subjective reality in our head, and cognition is a
reflection of one in the other. There is objective being and subjective being,
and as V.V. Orlov writes - what precedes what, what reflects what, and what is
the carrier of what?
Three components of phase
conjugation are recorded by V.V. Orlov: 'The first, or main, question of
philosophy, according to F. Engels, is the question of the relation of
consciousness to matter, or, in somewhat outdated terms, spirit to nature,
thinking to being. The main content and meaning of this question was described
by Engels in the brochure Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German
Philosophy (1886). The main issue of philosophy (BQPh) has a complex structure,
which leads to a wide variety of levels or sides.
Considering the first, most
fundamental level of phase conjugation, Engels distinguished two sides in it.
The first side of the question of the relation of consciousness to matter is
the question of what is primary - matter or consciousness, and, accordingly,
which of them acts as secondary, derivative, dependent. The concept of primacy
has three interconnected meanings in philosophy: 1) what exists first, i.e.
what precedes what, 2) what is a property or manifestation of another:
consciousness belongs to highly organized matter, or, conversely, the latter is
a manifestation of consciousness, 3) what reflects another', consciousness
reflects the material world external to it, or matter is a reflection of some
spirit. Often a different formulation of the question of primary-secondary is
used: what is the basis of the world: matter or consciousness" [8, p. 8].
It is known that every philosopher
solves his personal problems by choosing a particular topic. If we ignore each
author as a person, then we should come to an understanding of the situation of
the broad masses, who, due to idealism and religion, also solve their personal
and social issues. A. Gramsci wrote about this: 'Awareness by the broad masses
of their material impotence in the face of few oppressors leads to the
exaltation of purely spiritual values, etc., to passivity, to non-resistance,
to non-cooperation, which nevertheless are protection, but protection weak and
difficult, like protecting by a mattress from bullets' [2, p. 312].
Ten Questions to Philosophers
It remains to ask ten questions to
any philosopher who wants to be modern. These questions will be asked in the
style of Lenin's "Ten Questions to the Referent." Professional
philosophers should remember these one and a half pages of text sent to Geneva at a critical
moment in the party discussion on the definition of philosophical principles
for the new century.
A positive (correct, in our opinion)
answer to these questions will return philosophy to minds and social reality;
negative answers to the test will reliably determine the degree to which
representatives of the philosophical community fall to zero. Call it the level
in the range from 1 to 10.
1. Does the author recognize the
basic monistic division of philosophical systems into materialism and idealism?
2. Does the author acknowledge that
the middle fluctuating line between materialism and idealism is agnosticism
based on solipsism and subjective idealism, and versions of neo-Kantianism
(including sociology and phenomenological sociology of cognition) are a form of
3. Does the author acknowledge that
the existing external world is reflected in the human head, and the correctness
of this reflection is verified and achieved through socio-historical practice?
4. Does the author acknowledge that
the world is fundamentally cognizable for man and humanity and that there are
only differences between what is known and what is not yet known?
5. Does the author recognize that
the real unity of the world lies in its materiality and that there is nothing
supranaturalistic and, therefore, the so-called 'artificial intelligence' is
6. Does the author acknowledge that
matter without motion is as unthinkable as motion without matter, and space and
time are attributes of matter?
7. Does the author recognize that
truth is the correspondence of scientific knowledge to an object as a result of
the reflection of the laws of nature and the real world in the minds of people
and in the public consciousness?
8. Does the author recognize that
social matter, or objective social relations, determines the public
consciousness of people, or vice versa - do social representations define the
metric of social heterology?
9. Does the author acknowledge that
existing classes and class interests form human cognition and, therefore, the
doctrine of pluralism and tolerance, idealism and religion are reactionary in
nature and mask the interests of classes that are disappearing?
10. Does the author acknowledge that
the theories of post-industrialism are conceptually and practically untenable,
since they require a reduction in the world's population, sustainable
development, income from nature and redistribution of income in favor of rich
countries and the international financial oligarchy, and not from science and
How exist a scientific philosophy?
Philosophy today exists in a special
reality, which we will designate as the 'ideological apparatus of the state'
(IAS). It would seem that philosophy exists outside the state repressive
apparatus, but the philosophy of postmodernity (using the ideas of the French
Marxist L. Althusser is presented in the religious IAS (a system of various
churches); educational IAS (system of public and private "schools");
family IAS; legal IAS; political IAS (political system with parties); trade
union IAS; Information IAS (media cartels); cultural IAS (literature, art,
sports). We are talking about many bourgeois ideological apparatus if the
unified state suppression apparatus entirely belongs to the public sphere,
while most of the ideological apparatuses of the state belong to the private
sphere. This is the terminology we borrowed from the French Marxist L.
Althusser from an article we published .
Obviously, the main difference
between state apparatus (of suppression) and IAS is as follows: the state
apparatus (of suppression) "operates through violence", while the
state ideological apparatus operates "through ideology". Postmodern
philosophy exists in the interval between science and ideology, and therefore
acts as a politics and hides the political origin of the heuristic quest for
truth. However, the identification of this fact suggests the inevitability of
the formation of an up-to-date philosophy, which stands on the positions of
militant materialism and expresses the interests of the opposite side in the
IAS - the side of the oppressed people, their self-governing organizations and
the natural emancipators of humanity.
The request for a new scientific
philosophy becomes again relevant, within the framework of which philosophy
finds material weapons in the aggregate proletariat, and the proletariat
discovers spiritual weapons in philosophy. The true development of philosophy
begins as an antagonist of the ideological mystified products of the
ideological apparatuses of the late bourgeois state, which arose as a result of
a series of counter-revolutionary coups. From this point on, engaging in
philosophy means carrying out a revolution in the minds, preparing for the
return of the revolutionary tide in society, smashing the mold of the
post-modernist project in culture, overcoming the remnants of the
bourgeois-humanist storm of the first socialist society in history. For the
working people of the planet, in the face of the Western model of
globalization, the demand for philosophy becomes absolute in the conditions of
the domination of the mystification curtain over the prospects for the
development of society hanged by the manipulators of the ideological
apparatuses of the bourgeois state.
In the 'German ideology', K. Marx
demetaphorizes the concept of 'world spirit', under this is the 'world market':
'In the preceding history, it is also an unconditional empirical fact that
certain individuals, as their activities expand to world-historical activities,
more and more fell under the power of an alien force (in this oppression they
saw the machinations of the so-called world spirit, etc.) - under the power of
power, which is becoming increasingly widespread and ultimately manifests
itself as a world market' [5, p. 36]. And further: 'Comprehensive dependence,
this spontaneously formed form of world-historical joint activity of
individuals, is transformed, thanks to the communist revolution, into control
and conscious domination of forces that, being generated by the influence of
people on each other, still seemed to them completely alien forces and as such
dominated them. Again, this view can be interpreted speculatively idealistic,
that is, fantastically, as 'self-generation of the genus' ('society as a
subject'), imagining the whole series of consecutive and interconnected
individuals as a single individual committing the sacrament of procreation of
oneself. It is found here that although individuals both physically and
spiritually create each other, they, however, do not create themselves either
in the spirit of the nonsense of St. Bruno, or in the sense of the 'One',
'created' person. Thus, this understanding of history consists in considering,
proceeding from the material production of direct life, the actual process of
production...' [5, p. 36].
The French Marxist S.
Mercier-José in her book 'To read Hegel and Marx' writes that history is
not a history of people, it is a history of production methods. [17, p. 31]
Therefore, one should never forget about the class struggle, as Chairman Mao
Zedong urged. Back in 1937, he wrote in the work 'Regarding Practice. About the
connection between knowledge and practice - the connection between knowledge
and action", that "pre-Marxist materialism considered the issues of
knowledge in isolation from the social nature of people, in isolation from the
historical development of mankind and therefore could not understand the dependence
of knowledge on social practice, that is, the dependence of knowledge on
production and class struggle" [4, p. 379].
V.I. Lenin in the abstract of G.
Hegel's book 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy' especially emphasizes the
comparison of the history of philosophy with the circle and quotes: 'this
circle has a great many circles around its edges.' V.I. Lenin in the margins
remarks: 'A very deep, true comparison!! Every shade of thought = a circle on a
great circle (spiral) of the development of human thought in general'[3, p.
221]. The foregoing means that all new circles on the great circle are useful,
since they allow us to rethink the main issue, which has become, ultimately,
the main issue and the imperative of the existence of scientific philosophy.
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Table of contents: The Kazakh-American Free University Academic Journal №11 - 2019